Property-owning democracy and the circumstances of politics by Cheneval, Francis
Analyse & Kritik 01/2013 (© Lucius & Lucius, Stuttgart) S. 255269
Francis Cheneval
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Abstract: The article argues that Rawls's property-owning democracy should not be
understood as a necessary standard of democratic legitimacy. This position contradicts
Rawls's own understanding to some extent, but a rejoinder with elements of political
liberalism is possible. He concedes that justice as fairness is a `comprehensive liberal
doctrine' and that a well ordered society affirming such a doctrine `contradicts rea-
sonable pluralism'. Rawls makes clear that reasonable pluralism in combination with
the burdens of judgment lead to rare unanimity in political life and to the necessity of
majority and plurality voting procedures.
1. Introduction
Property-owning democracy (POD) can be understood in a weaker and a stronger
sense, that is, as an institutional description of a just society we can reasonably
defend, or as the necessary standard of democratic legitimacy we cannot reason-
ably reject.1 The weaker understanding is fairly obvious, in any event, I don't
intend to focus on it in this article. Furthermore, I consider it unproblematic
that if political agreement is reached on POD in open elections or constitutional
vote, the realization of POD is legitimate. The question I address concerns the
stronger understanding: If an institutional setting is confirmed by majoritarian
legislation yet is not a POD (nor market socialism), would it have to be consid-
ered illegitimate from a democratic point of view? I argue that the POD is wor-
thy of serious consideration, but should not be considered a necessary standard
of democratic legitimacy. POD emerges as one of the well-argued conceptions
of a just society, but must compete with other reasonable conceptions within a
democratic framework. Such a framework can produce less or more demanding
instantiations of justice than conceived in Rawls's POD. These potential instan-
tiations of justice via open and reversible voting are democratically legitimate
given the profound disagreement among reasonably arguing defenders of differ-
ent conceptions of justice, and given the profound injustice of guardianship that
would follow if the debate were to be closed by coercion and inalterability. This
1 I do not allude to Scanlon's 1998 contractualist standard to judge the moral rightness of
an action. Rather, I speak of elements actors cannot reasonably reject in establishing binding
collective decision-making procedures.
256 Francis Cheneval
of course applies to all the rival conceptions of justice that are being discussed
as alternatives to POD.
The plausibility of this argument can be illustrated by the fact that the idea
of a POD is controversial (see Williamson/O'Neill 2009) even among egalitarian
philosophers who share many of Rawls's assumptions, but who, for instance,
do not subscribe to his critique of the welfare state (Krouse/McPherson 1988;
O'Neill 2012), have a different idea of the market, property, and democratic
socialism (Schweickart 1979; DiQuattro 1983), or who share the goal of POD
but question its feasibility (see John Roemer in this issue). POD is also based
on another controversial idea: the difference principle. For some, this principle
compromises liberty for equality (Nozick 1974), for others it is not sufficiently or
not effectively egalitarian, even if combined with equal opportunity and the first
principle of justice. At best it does away with some symptoms of injustice in so-
ciety but does not effectively compensate individuals for unchosen disadvantages
(Cohen 2008).
In section 2 of the article, I show that Rawls understands his theory of jus-
tice as also being a theory of democracy. In sections 3 and 4, I demonstrate
that Rawls's view is too narrow from the point of view of political legitimacy
and that a different standard of democracy is needed in order to accommodate
political disagreement pertaining also to non-religious and yet very conflicting
conceptions of justice within a theory of democratic legitimacy. This position
however, does not have to be understood as being in total conflict with Rawls.
In many parts of his work, particularly in his revisited account on public reason,
Rawls concedes that justice as fairness is presented by him as a comprehensive
liberal doctrine and that a well ordered society affirming such a doctrine con-
tradicts reasonable pluralism (Rawls 1997, 807). Contrary to this particularistic
liberal account, political liberalism concedes that conflicting accounts of justice
are to be considered by justice as fairness or by other reasonable conceptions of
justice. Rawls makes clear that reasonable pluralism in combination with the
burdens of judgment lead to the situation of rare unanimity in political life and
therefore/thereby to the necessity of majority and plurality voting procedures
(Rawls 1997, 798, 805). In his account of public justification and public reason
Rawls focuses heavily on the question of compatibility of religious comprehensive
doctrines and democracy. He rather neglects the question of adversarial, non-
religious conceptions of justice and conflicting notions of democracy. He sees
these conceptions as part of a family that is held together by the limiting fea-
ture of reciprocity (Rawls 1997, 7734). But I think that Rawls overestimates
the family harmony that reciprocity can create among conflicting non-religious
conceptions of justice. In this article, I confront POD with the question of the
democratic framework of adversarial conceptions of reciprocity and justice and
with the related question of the political principles that guide a framework that
incorporates conflicting conceptions of justice into democratic decision-making.
In sum, my point is that POD is a thoughtful theory of democracy but not a
necessary standard of democratic legitimacy.
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2. Rawls's Theory of Justice as Theory of Democracy
2.1 Rawls on the Relation of Justice and Democracy
John Rawls never developed a full-fledged theory of democracy. He is the author
of an influential theory of justice. However, his conception of justice is nothing
short of a general design of democratic society. Already in the preface to the
first edition of A Theory of Justice (TJ), Rawls states that his conception of jus-
tice as fairness constitutes the most appropriate moral basis for a democratic
society (Rawls 1971, xviii). In the preface to the second edition, Rawls writes
that the ideas and aims of justice as fairness are those of a philosophical con-
ception for a constitutional democracy which will seem reasonable and useful,
even if not fully convincing, to a wide range of thoughtful political opinions and
thereby express an essential part of the common core of the democratic tradi-
tion (Rawls 1999, xi). Rawls sees a broad connection between his conception
of justice as fairness and democracy. The constitutional principles of democracy
are not identical with the philosophical principles of justice, but they form the
foundational principles of a democratic constitution. Not only does the concep-
tion of justice involve both of Rawls's principles of justice and their complex
relation, the close connection of justice as fairness to democracy also implies a
systemic combination of these two principles (Daniels 2003, 245). According to
Rawls it is the combination of the two principles of justice that constitutes the
basis of a liberal democratic regime and a democratic society at large that meets
the needs of free and equal citizens via fair terms of cooperation (Cohen 1989).
In chapter two of TJ, Rawls specifies more precisely what he means by the
`core' of the democratic tradition. He clearly aims at a particular egalitarian
conception of democracy that is closely, albeit not exclusively, tied to a just
distribution of wealth and income (Democratic equality and the difference prin-
ciple). Although much could be said about democracy and a free democratic
society from the point of view of pluralism, freedom of choice, free market, and
procedural fairness along Rawlsian lines, Rawls himself, from very early on, links
the qualification `democratic' directly and specifically to the necessary conjunc-
tion of the principle of fair equality of opportunity and the difference principle.
The latter two regulate the socio-economic distribution of wealth and income
within the basic structure as a fair system of cooperation. Without the inclu-
sion of these systemic elements a society cannot be a democratic society, formal
rights of participation notwithstanding.
More precisely, Rawls uses the term `democratic' to qualify one of four pos-
sible interpretations of distributive justice and affirms that all other interpreta-
tions, including the liberal interpretation, are defective (Rawls 1971, 73). In
chapter II.13 of TJ, the term `democratic' stands for a particular interpretation
of equality that is more ambitious than the system of equal formal liberty and
the liberal interpretation of fair equality of opportunity. `Democratic' stands
for the necessary conjunction of the principle of fair equality of opportunity
with Maximin. It stands for an effective safeguard of the capabilities of citizens
(Daniels 2003, 270). Social positions must be open to all in a fair and not just
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formal manner, and the distributive consequences of their occupation must be
to everyone's advantage (Rawls 1971, 83).
Rawls insists that the difference principle expresses a conception of reci-
procity; it is a principle of mutual benefit (Rawls 1971, 102). Inequalities are
justifiable if and only if more benefit is thereby produced and everybody gets
a fair share. B can accept A's being better off since A's advantages have been
gained in ways that improve B's prospects. If A were not allowed his better
position, B would be worse off than he is. (103) According to Rawls, such a
system can be justified to everyone, in particular to those who are least favored
(103). Rawls seems to therefore call this system democratic because it aims
at justifying at least the most basic distributive outcomes to everyone, to the
people at large, as opposed to a qualified group of privileged or underprivileged
within society. The democratic society is characterized by a harmony of inter-
ests (104), by the understanding that in a cooperative society benefit has to be
mutual if the order is to be justifiable. The difference principle strives for the
inclusion of everyone in mutually advantageous societal arrangements, regardless
of their native endowments.
To express the relation of his theory of justice to the common core of demo-
cratic theory Rawls reconnects with the term `fraternity' that complements lib-
erty and equality. According to Rawls, the difference principle offers an inter-
pretation of the principle of fraternity that, as he sees it, has been neglected
by democratic theory (105). The principle of fraternity does not define specific
democratic rights. Rather, it conveys
certain attitudes of mind and forms of conduct without which we
would lose sight of the values expressed by these rights. Or closely
related to this, fraternity is held to represent a certain equality of
social esteem manifest in various public conventions and in the ab-
sence of manners of deference and servility. No doubt fraternity does
imply these things, as well as a sense of civic friendship and social
solidarity, but so understood it expresses no definite requirement.
(105)
Rawls believes that, in addition to the attitudinal dimension of fraternity, the
difference principle expresses the core idea of fraternity by stating the idea of
not wanting to have greater advantages unless this is to the benefit of others who
are less well off. The difference principle substantiates fraternity with a more
concrete requirement. A democratic society guided by fraternity is an extended
family in the sense that no one is willing to move ahead without taking every-
body along at least to a certain extent. Furthermore, a connection between the
principle of fraternity and the difference principle has the advantage of not pro-
moting an unrealistic, sentiment driven face-to-face fraternity among citizens.
Rawls thinks that the difference principle establishes a general requirement that
makes fraternity a feasible standard and a necessary complement of any demo-
cratic society deserving its name. Rawls himself has given an accurate summary
of his view of the relation between justice and democracy:
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we can associate the traditional ideas of liberty, equality, and fra-
ternity with the democratic interpretation of the two principles of
justice as follows: liberty corresponds to the first principle, equality
to the idea of equality in the first principle together with equality of
opportunity, and fraternity to the difference principle. (106)
2.2 Democracy in Rawls's Conception of POD
What does an analysis of Rawls's idea of POD add to this account of Rawls's no-
tion of democracy? I will first try to show that Rawls's account of POD mainly
tells us something new about the relation of democracy to the first principle. As
mentioned in the introduction, Rawls and others have said much about the dis-
tinction between POD and the utilitarian welfare state as well as the difference
between socialism and a private-property economy. These are not the subject
matters that I focus on here. I am interested in the implications of Rawls's state-
ments for democratic theory and for a coherent understanding of `democracy' in
`POD'.
According to Rawls's standard account, in a POD private ownership of pro-
ductive assets and human capital would be widely dispersed ex ante and against
the background of equal basic liberties and fair equality of opportunity. Rawls's
idea is to put all citizens in a position to manage their own affairs and to take
part in social cooperation on a footing of mutual respect under appropriately
equal conditions (Rawls 1999, xv). Rawls insists on the term `citizen'as op-
posed to `human individual'as owner of productive means and thereby treats
the question of distribution of assets in a political context within the basic struc-
ture. Dispersal of private ownership of productive assets has to be steady and
sustained over time by laws of inheritance and bequest. In this manner only
citizens become fully cooperating members of society over time. The aim is
to realize the economic autonomy of all citizens, the lack of which undermines
political autonomy and fair democratic procedure. Again, according to Rawls,
democracy is at the heart of the matter. Welfare state capitalism only brings
the worst-off to a certain level but leaves untouched the great economic inequal-
ities that are, according to Rawls, incompatible with the fair value of political
liberty (xv).
In this account of Rawls, the difference principle still plays a role, but the
argument in favor of the wide dispersal of property of productive assets and
human capital is sufficiently determined by the first principle as expressed in the
fair value of equal political liberty in a democratic society. In other words, POD
refers to equal liberty, which is lexically prior to the difference principle and for
which there is a stronger argumentative basis than for the difference principle
according the Rawls of the second edition of TJ (Rawls 1999, xiv).
According to Rawls, the theory of justice does not and cannot determine
whether the private-property economy or market socialism with public ownership
of productive assets better corresponds to the requirements of justice. The
answer to this question depends on traditions, institutions, and social forces
of each country, and its particular historical circumstances (Rawls 1999, 242;
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2001, 139). In other words, the decision and correction of the proportion of public
and private ownership is a matter of constant democratic debate and revision
within a democratic framework that is not predetermined by POD. According
to Rawls, such a decision has to follow just procedure for choosing between
governments and for enacting just legislation (243). He probably thinks that a
private-property economy better corresponds to the US-American tradition, but
in theory this is up for change in the future. Be that as it may, any change in
system would have to be decided by democratic procedures that are open to but
not determined by POD. There is no natural right to the ownership of productive
assets just like there is no natural right to worker-owned and managed firms. In
other words, according to Rawls, the decision of how to best organize society is
to be determined by a fair democratic procedure.
An important element of such a fair procedure is the guarantee of the fair
value political liberty (Rawls 1999, 245; 2001, 13940). From the Rawlsian
democratic point of view, it is not enough to just prevent everybody from falling
bellow a certain minimum threshold of a decent life if this does not ensure the
fair value of political liberty at the same time. Here again, the importance of
the first principle of equal liberty, including equal political liberty, is obvious for
a Rawlsian account of democracy. In order to preserve the fair value of political
liberty, the distribution branch of government must correct the distribution of
wealth, for instance by applying the progressive principle, in order to prevent
concentrations of power that are detrimental to political liberty. Consequently,
a wide dispersal of private property is a necessary condition of the fair value of
political liberty, which in turn is part of a fair political procedure in democracy
(Rawls 1999, 245). In a non-ideal environment, taxation of inheritance and
income at a progressive rate as well as legal constraints to property rights might
ensure equal liberty in a POD (Rawls 1999, 247). The aim of all branches of
government is to establish and preserve a democratic regime in which land and
capital are widely though not presumably equally held. Society is not so divided
that one fairly small sector controls the preponderance of productive resources.
(247) If these criteria of wide dispersal of private property of productive assets
are met, the socialist criticisms of the market economy are unfounded and hence
the decision between a private property society and market socialism in which
firms are publically owned and managed by workers councils etc. becomes one
of tradition rather than justice (248).
In this sense, it is interesting to see that Rawls defends the market for both
POD and socialism as a requirement of justice. His defense includes a negative
and a positive argument. On the negative side, Rawls questions the possibility
and quality of control of all economic activity by a government, whose decisions
are to completely replace the market. A society in which this would be possible
is not a just society but a society beyond justice, a society that has already
eliminated the conditions under which it is necessary to appeal to justice (249).
On the positive side of the argument, Rawls mentions freedom of choice, espe-
cially freedom of choice of occupation. Abandoning the market system violates
the first principle expressed as equal freedom of choice (Rawls 1999, 231, 2401;
2001, 138).
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Within the context of his discussion of the economic institutions of a POD,
Rawls mentions, at the end of the chapter, that he does not think that the
difference principle ought to be explicitly stated in constitutions and enforced
by courts. It is not possible to settle with exactness whether the principle is
met. Rather, Rawls appeals to democratic consent to mention the principle in a
non enforceable preamble of the constitution as an aspirational principle (Rawls
2001, 162).
The result of this section is twofold: firstly, Rawls sees POD as being in le-
gitimate democratic competition with market socialism. This democratic com-
petition needs to be more formal and procedural than the conditions of POD
imply; secondly, he does not consider the difference principle to be enforceable.
Both points beg the question according to what standards that do not already
presuppose POD or justice as fairness could decisions be taken legitimately. How
does society come to legitimately enforceable decisions regarding POD vs. mar-
ket socialism and regarding the realization of the difference principles or other
competing moral principles of justice?
3. POD and Political Liberalism
Rawls's view of POD leads to the critical observation that Rawls has, or at
least should make explicit, two conceptions of democracy. One is implied in
political liberalism and not further explained by Rawls. It leaves room for the
democratic competition of different conceptions of justice and different concrete
modes of implementation. Rawls's other conception of democracy, the one he
makes explicit in his theory of justice and POD, is much more narrow and,
according to many critics, not sufficiently democratic in the sense that it does
not seem to portray democracy as an open system of deliberation and collective
choice among a broader spectrum of deliberate societal models. I will call this
objection the democracy-objection (Waldron 1999; Cohen 2003; Klosko 2004;
Reidy 2007). It holds, that the substantive constitutional constraints suggested
by justice as fairness would preempt a free democratic discussion and decision
process on the very issues of justice and fairness. Rawls, so the argument,
subordinates democracy to his own conception of justice and reciprocity.
Joshua Cohen traces this objection back to Habermas. He distinguishes and
identifies the institutional subordination-problem, the denigration-problem, and
the `mistrust of citizens'-problem (Cohen 2003, 11131). The problems of in-
stitutional subordination and denigration consist in the point that the idealized
process of collective decision making represents a guardian-like position that
subordinates democratic decision making to the judgment of an epistemic elite
and thereby denigrates the importance of public argument and political partic-
ipation. It also implies a mistrust of citizens (Cohen 2003). Cohen points to
the fact that the problem is not Rawls's substantive claim to justice as fairness
as a moral standard of democracy. Any moral theory is entitled, if not required,
to make standards of justice available in its own right. Rawls's problem, ac-
cording to Cohen, is the lack of a plausible account of political disagreement.
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Rawls fails to recognize and idealizes that not everyone holds the same moral
conception of justice, that there is no moral consensus, no unanimity, no `general
will' regarding a conception of justice (Cohen 2003, 115, 12831). Along a simi-
lar line of argumentation, David A. Reidy diagnoses that Rawls problematically
underestimates the extent of reasonable disagreement (Reidy 2007, 259ff.).
Whether this objection is correct depends on the underlying account of rea-
sonable political disagreement and political notion of democracy. The latter can
still have normative elements, but in order to satisfy the democracy-objection
it needs to represent a different reciprocal agreement as it tries to accommo-
date different conceptions of justice and relate them to a broader conception of
democratic legitimacy. In such a conception, Rawls's notion of democracy and
his idea of an overlapping consensus have to be put into relation with a more
open and more formal notion founding the conditions of a democracy in which
Rawls's conception of justice and POD are only a reasonable position among
other reasonable and thoughtful positions. They cannot predetermine the con-
ditions of the debate, let alone be implemented by coercive means. In other
words, the consensus about democracy as a political institution rests on a wider
notion of democracy, in which the Rawlsian notion is proposed and debated.
It is obvious that Rawls himself acknowledges reasonable pluralism and rea-
sonable disagreement in theory and in relation to his own positions. Reasonable
pluralism refers to the fact that a plurality of reasonable comprehensive doc-
trines, religious, philosophical, and moral, is the normal condition of democratic
culture given its free institutions (Rawls 2005, xxxvi, n. 3). Even more im-
portantly with regard to Cohen's objection, Rawls thinks that his conception
of justice is a political conception that can regulate reasonable pluralism of
comprehensive doctrines. He states that the distinction between his political
conception of justice from comprehensive doctrines is the crucial idea of politi-
cal liberalism (Rawls 2005, xxxvi). Rawls claims to present a political concep-
tion of political justice for a constitutional democratic regime that a plurality
of reasonable doctrines, both religious and non-religious, liberal and non-liberal,
may freely endorse, and so freely live by and come to understand its virtues
(Rawls 2005, xxxviii). On a second level of reflection, Rawls includes factual or
possible disagreement and plurality with regard to his own conception of justice.
He indicates that his arguments, especially the ones on the difference principle,
are `less evident', do not meet general acceptance and are not constitutionally
enforceable. From the start, Rawls leaves room for disagreement on his concep-
tion of justice and democratic equality when he says that his arguments seem
reasonable and useful, even if not fully convincing, to a wide range of thoughtful
political opinions (Rawls 1999, xi, emphasis added). Given such consideration
of thoughtful disagreement and given the insistence on the political status of his
theory, the objection that Rawls leaves no room for political disagreement or
underestimates the extent of reasonable disagreement is true for his account of
justice as fairness but requires further explanation regarding political liberalism.
The central question is what could be meant by reasonable political dis-
agreement. We can assume that moral disagreement is about value judgments
and leave this question to the side for our purposes (Raz 1994, 97ff.). Political
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disagreement can be understood as a disagreement about which position, moral
or non-moral, the political community should enforce. This disagreement is
reasonable if the solution to this problem is sought on grounds of a mutually
acceptable political process of decision making (Waldron 1999, 37). But Rawls
is more ambitious. He does not accept, or at least claims, to go beyond the
modus vivendi of mutual interest as a way of coping with political disagreement.
He thinks that his political conception of justice and idea of overlapping con-
sensus can accommodate political disagreement within a philosophical theory
while other conceptions cannot because they are either too comprehensive, and
thereby mutually exclusive, or they are not morally demanding and only based
on happenstance and balance of relative forces.
Is it a problem for political liberalism and public reason that Rawls states
that his political conception of justice is itself a moral conception (i.e. compre-
hensive) and is stable on grounds of the recognition of moral principles (Rawls
2005, 147)? Not really, because comprehensive doctrines are not forbidden in
public justification. Rather, the adherents of comprehensive doctrines need to
argue their case in terms of political values and principles others can accept
(Rawls 1997, 776). The real problem is Rawls's rather narrow interpretation
of reciprocity, the latter being the criterion of reasonableness of different but
politically acceptable conceptions of justice (Rawls 1997, 774, 797). Reciprocity
is not reducible to a peaceful modus vivendi arbitrated by majority voting or
mere mutual advantage from an objective observer's point of view. Rather it is
the attitude of an actor A who excepts mutual advantage as a desired outcome
even if he or she could settle for greater advantage to the disadvantage of B.
Reciprocity à la Rawls is accepting to switch to the point of view of all the
others and only accepting what is justified from all perspectives, it is reciprocity
of justification (Reidy 2007, 2489). Rawls's liberal conception of political le-
gitimacy as reciprocity in public justification depends on the original position,
not political settlement. And the only conception of justice acceptable in the
original position is justice as fairness.
Furthermore, according to Rawls only POD and market socialism correspond
to justice as fairness as political conception of justice. Hence any democratic
decision that is taken under circumstances that differ from these models or with
a different outcome is more or less illegitimate due to a lack of `justice as fairness'-
pedigree. Little to no room is left for free democratic choice and constant revision
in successive elections and votes in which competing conceptions of justice and
societal models are constantly enacted and corrected. Marxists, libertarians,
communitarians and so forth need to be considered in unreasonable disagreement
with political liberalism because communitarians and Marxists give priority to
the good over the right while libertarians mistakenly make dyadic transactions
the first subject of justice. The political disagreement that Rawls's model of
political liberalism is able to accommodate is limited to some form of property-
owning or social democracy, because, as Waldron puts it, Rawls's model assumes
all the fundamental work has been done in the Original Position (Waldron
1999, 72).
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Furthermore, he states that in political philosophy, we should not wish away
the fact that we find ourselves living and acting alongside many with whom there
is little prospect of our sharing a view about justice, rights or political morality
(Waldron 1999, 154). This rightly means that permanent disagreement is likely
to exist not only with regard to comprehensive doctrines, but also regarding
conceptions of justice and the scope of the overlapping consensus itself. Beyond
that, it concerns many issues on which a community urgently needs to share a
common view or take collective action. The political condition of a community
is its need to take coercive collective action on issues over which its members are
divided. But as I have indicated from the beginning, Rawls himself concluded
that the claim of first priority of the principles of justice was inconsistent with
the fact of reasonable pluralism (Rawls 2005, xliixliii).
As I have shown, we cannot ease the tension between Rawls's notion of democ-
racy based on justice as fairness and political liberalism by referring to to Rawls's
account of public reason as a different idea of justification. Granted, the idea of
public reason requires that questions of constitutional essentials and matters of
basic justice be settled by appealing to political values (Scanlon 2003, 161). Such
values are not part of reasonable comprehensive views, but include substantive
ideas of justice, including basic rights, liberties, opportunities, and substantive
ideas of public inquiry and civic debate. However, as is obvious from Rawls's
notion of reciprocity and as Scanlon pointed out, Rawls does not spell out a
full set of political values and, more importantly, he does not recede from his
commitment to the conception of justice in his determination of the criterion
of political acceptability (Scanlon 2003, 162). In other words, Rawls's distinc-
tion between justice as fairness as a comprehensive doctrine and his account
of political liberalism implies two notions of democracy: one developed within
the Rawlsian account of justice and one developed on the grounds of reasonable
pluralism. POD, as presented by Rawls, is part of the first notion of democracy.
4. Democratic Legitimacy, Political Liberty and
Reciprocity
One might ask whether this judgment still stands when confronted with the de-
mands of political liberty, more broadly understood than in freedom of speech,
and economic reciprocity. After all, democracyeven in its minimal notionis
modeled as a contract of citizens. Liberty and reciprocity are necessary condi-
tions of contract. The non-economic dimensions of political community notwith-
standing, nobody enters a contract rationally to gain nothing or to be perma-
nently worse off in material terms. If cooperative economic gain is real, all part-
ners are entitled to a share; if sacrifice is necessary, it needs to be distributed
evenhandedly among the partners of the contract. Such are the demands of
the basic contract of democracy. Along a similar line of thought, political lib-
erty is a basic condition of democracy. If it is deficient, democratic legitimacy
is jeopardized because no meaningful participation of citizens is possible under
conditions lacking basic political liberty. In other words, reciprocity regarding
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the distribution of cooperative gains and political liberty seem to be part of the
core notion of democracy. Consequently, the question that needs to be addressed
regarding the theme of this article is if economic reciprocity and political liberty
as conceived within the notion of POD are part of the inner core of democratic
legitimacy, or if weaker or different versions of these conditions apply. Again, I
will argue that a different interpretation of these principles applies in a notion
of democratic legitimacy.
4.1 Political Liberty and Democratic Legitimacy
I will start with political liberty since it is part of the first and lexically prior
principle of equal basic liberties according to Rawls. Within the notion of POD,
the principle of equal political liberty possibly restricts permissible inequalities
of income and wealth that might otherwise be allowed by the difference principle
(Rawls 2001, 46, n. 10). Rawls's line of thought is the following: In welfare-state
capitalism and laissez-faire types of capitalism, private ownership and control of
production are concentrated in the hands of a minority. Consequently, there are
large inequalities, not only of income and wealth, but also in the exercise of effec-
tive political power and influence over the political agenda. According to Rawls,
laissez-faire capitalism and welfare-state capitalism both reject the fair value of
political liberty by tolerating extreme inequalities. The latter are structurally
tolerated or even necessary in the institutional descriptions of capitalist systems.
As such they cancel the fair value of political liberty (Rawls 2001, 1378). If
political liberty is not ascertained, so one could argue, democratic legitimacy is
jeopardized and extra-constitutional resistance against such a regime is as legit-
imate as against an authoritarian regime. It follows from this conclusion that
the wide individual distribution of productive assets, as proposed in the idea of
POD, is a core demand of democratic legitimacy also within what I have called
the second, genuinely political notion of democratic legitimacy.
There are two possible external arguments against this line of thought, which
I will briefly mention but do not want to pursue further in this article. One exter-
nal argument against Rawls is the distinction between liberty and power. Rawls
obviously identifies `fair value of political liberty' with some degree of economic
power and influence, not with the right to speak freely, to freely associate with
others, and to vote without being constrained or forced. Thus, one could argue
that Rawls, like many others, confuses liberty with power. The debate concern-
ing this issue is stimulating, but an assessment of the argument on these grounds
would most likely be predicated by the choice of a negative, positive or combined
conception of freedom and thereby carry the burdens of proof attached to what-
ever choice is made (Berlin 2002; MacCallum 1967; Sen 1988; Sudgen 2004). It
is preferable and, as I will show, possible to bring the argument further without
such additional argumentative burdens.
The second external argument against Rawls could be to accuse him of re-
ducing influence to auence. Political influence depends on a large number of
factors. The direct availability of economic means to an individual is only one
of them and arguably not the most important one under many circumstances.
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Political influence is conditioned by the dynamics of collective action (Olson
1971; Becker 1983; Banfield 2003). The over-determined and essentially col-
lective nature of political influence leads to a myriad of possibilities of com-
pensations and trade-offs between the factors responsible for this phenomenon.
Secondly, influence is always directed at someone regarding a subject matter.
An actor A does not simply have influence; A has influence over an individual
or a group B regarding the subject matter X. This means that the question if
income and wealth of an actor is decisive for his or her political influence depends
on the person or group over which this influence is exercised and on the subject
matter. If the subject matter at stake in a political conflict has to do with deep
feelings of identity and recognition, economic influence will be less important
than in regard to questions of minimal salary, working hours, etc. None of these
arguments are decisive arguments against Rawls's objection against excessive
economic inequality, but they show that going down the road of the auence-
influence argument we get sidetracked into an empirical argument about the
complex circumstances of political influence in which, at least in some cases, it
can be assumed that factors other than individual wealth are decisive.
For the reasons mentioned in the two former paragraphs I will not pursue the
two external arguments against Rawls any further. For the time being, I will
accept Rawls's notion of political liberty as including some degree of equality
of power and influence. Given such a presupposition, I will show that Rawls's
own conception of liberty demands a different kind of condition than individ-
ual equality of economic resources assured by fairly equal private property of
productive means.
Rawls's idea is that the economic and social equality brought about by POD
or liberal socialism guarantees the fair value of political liberty by giving indi-
viduals a more equal share in income and wealth. According to the institutional
description of a POD, a small societal group ought not to be able to control
neither the economy nor political life. But note that the argument, even on
Rawlsian grounds, is not and cannot be strictly individualistic. Free political
action is individual action and/or group action (Daniels 2003, 242). Hence, even
if individuals were strictly equal regarding income and wealth, some could per-
manently overpower others by forming stable groups of collective action. Under
conditions of freedom of association and freedom of pooling resources, even the
strictest material equality of all individuals does not assure political liberty un-
derstood as fairly equal power. If A, B, and C are materially equal and B and
C team up, A is overpowered and, in order to prevent this, A would have to be
twice as powerful as B and C. Individual equality of economic resources is no
guarantee of political liberty understood as individual power.
In order to solve the problem of the missing political power of the worst off,
what has to be prevented is that the worst-off individuals can no longer form a
group sufficiently powerful to avoid total control of the political institutions by
the best-off group or any other intermediary group. It seems to me that some
passages in Rawls, where he considers the social position of groups rather than
individuals as such, also point into this direction (Rawls 1999, xiv). In sum,
even strict individual equality of economic power could not ascertain individual
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influence over the political agenda under conditions of freedom of association,
because under such conditions individual citizens can still form groups to over-
power others. Hence, the demand of an argument that relates political liberty
and economic power in view of achieving fair value of political liberty cannot be
individual economic equality. The argument that aims at ascertaining fair value
of political liberty as influence over the political agenda and concedes freedom of
association and pooling of resources at the same time, demands an institutional
design in which the permanent economic domination of any societal group is
avoided. This means that the fair value of political liberty within a political no-
tion of democratic legitimacy is ascertained if the collective power of the group
of the worst-off does not go below the point where its exercise of meaningful
influence over the political agenda becomes impossible. In other words, accord-
ing to a political and liberal notion of democracy, the fair value of political
liberty is strict equality of formal liberties combined with the avoidance of ex-
cessive inequality that leads to the impossibility of effective political action of
the worst-off.
4.2 Reciprocity and Democratic Legitimacy
Behind the veil of ignorance, reciprocity is spelled out in the form of the two
principles of justice. As I have argued, we cannot presuppose that the argument
about the principles of justice is settled behind the veil of ignorance. One of
the tangible advantages of democracy is the periodic revision of the gains and
losses by all actors via the constant repetition of elections and/or votes. Morally
ambitious reciprocity in a one-shot agreement behind the veil of ignorance, as
in Rawls's public reason, is replaced in political democracy by the reasonable
assumption of reaching diffuse reciprocity via the periodic repetition of elections
and votes. This, of course, raises an empirical question about the circumstances
that will favor or hinder reciprocity and reversibility. Nevertheless, it is fair to
say that in case diffuse reciprocity does not come about over time, the demo-
cratic consensus will break apart. A real contract under conditions of reasonably
complete information about one's actual and future social position will only take
place if the worst-off see some gain in being part of a cooperative arrangement.
This will not lead to maximin but to some form of advantage gained over time
even by the worst-off during a process of repeated assessment of gains and losses
in electoral cycles. That is probably the institutional reason why majoritarian
legislation, over time, has ushered in the welfare state in many democracies.
Note that such a demand might go beyond Klosko's fifth basic principle of
the liberal consensus (distribution according to merit and equality of opportu-
nity) because democratic procedure possibly gives leverage to those who do not
necessarily have merit (Klosko 2004). In other words, democracy as majoritar-
ian rule of law most certainly does not provide a one-shot maximin outcome,
but the democratic contract is premised upon the economic gain of all partici-
pants over time and it provides for the assessment of diffuse gains and losses by
the periodic repetition of elections and votes. In this sense, diffuse reciprocity
is a basic condition of democracy. The real progress of majoritarian legislation,
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pointed out by Waldron (Waldron 1999), has only been possible because of some
degree of diffuse reciprocity of interest in the distribution of economic gains. In
sum, the procedural realization of diffuse reciprocity is ascertained by the pre-
scription of periodical repetition of decision procedures and a periodical option
of reversibility.
5. Conclusion
The theory of POD is a reasonable theory of justice, but the term `democracy'
needs clarifications substantiated in this article. A theory of POD is in fact
democratic as long as: a) it does not pretend to fully represent the unique
ideal standpoint and b) does not claim that its standard implies the license
for coercive implementation without going through the filter of majoritarian
legislation. Within such a model of democracy, a broad scope of doctrines and
interpretations of justice are discussed by citizens and it needs to be possible for
citizens to adopt doctrines more to the `left' or more to the `right' of POD and
to periodically revise any adoption they have made in the past.
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